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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 900172

v.
Category No. 13

REID H. ELLIS,
Defendant-Petitioner.

OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Three issues are presented by petitioner for review: 1
1.

Did the court of appeals erroneously reject

petitioner's claim that the trial court should have suppressed
certain evidence on the ground that petitioner's arrest was
illegal?
2.

Did the court of appeals erroneously reject

petitioner's claim that the trial court should have suppressed
certain evidence on the ground that it was illegally seized
without a warrant?
3.

Did the court of appeals erroneously reject

petitioner's claim that the trial court allowed an unlawful
amendment to the information under which petitioner was charged?
This brief in opposition is submitted pursuant to a request for
a response to the petitioner's petition by the Court. The
attorney general had previously filed a letter, dated May 4,
1990, which indicated that the State waived the right to file a
brief in opposition to the petition. See Utah R. App. P. 50(d).

OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals affirmed petitioner's convictions
by "Order of Affirmance" issued pursuant to rule 31, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, on March 15, 1990 (a copy of that order
is contained in Appendix A ) .
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Reid H. Ellis, was charged by information
with assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990); retail theft, a class B
misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (1990); and unlawful
possession of alcohol by a minor, a class B misdemeanor, under
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-13(1) (1986).
found guilty as charged.

After a jury trial, he was

The trial court sentenced petitioner to

180 days in jail, fined him $350, and ordered him to pay
restitution.

The court stayed execution of sentence and placed

petitioner on six months' probation, the conditions of which
included service of jail time.
Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Utah Court
of Appeals, which affirmed without opinion under rule 31, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner's recitation of the facts is quite different
from that presented by the Rich County Attorney to the court of

appeals.

Because the attorney general has not had an

opportunity to review independently the record in this case, it
will rely on the county attorney's recitation of the facts as an
accurate statement of the evidence presented at trial.

See Br.

of Resp. at 2-8 (a copy of the county attorney's brief, in its
entirety, is contained in Appendix B).

It must be presumed that,

in light of its affirmance of petitioner's convictions under rule
31, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals had
no significant disagreement with that recitation of the facts
after its review of the record.
ARGUMENT
PETITIONER HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY SUBSTANTIAL
ISSUES WHICH WARRANT REVIEW BY THIS COURT.
Petitioner argues that the trial court should have
suppressed certain evidence because he was illegally arrested and
the arresting officer conducted an illegal warrantless search,
and that the information filed against him was unlawfully amended
to charge more serious crimes.

Therefore, he asserts, the court

of appeals erred in affirming his convictions.
Although this case admittedly is one where the police
appear to have created a more volatile situation than was
necessary to effective law enforcement and thus were probably

Because this case originated in the circuit court, the county
attorney, who prosecuted the case at trial, represented the State
on appeal in the court of appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 78-4-11 (1987). In accordance with its statutory obligation to
represent the State in this Court, see Utah Code Ann. S 67-5-1(1)
(Supp. 1990), the attorney general appears on this response to
the petition for writ of certiorari.

guilty of poor judgment,

3

the arguments by the county attorney to

the court of appeals on the issues identified by petitioner in
the instant petition, which the court of appeals presumably
accepted, are legally supportable.

See Br. of Resp. at 14-20.

And while the fourth amendment issues may be somewhat close, the
court of appeals' decision is not inconsistent with decisions of
this Court or the United States Supreme Court.

See Schneckloth

v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent exception to warrant
requirement); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983)
(standard for determining probable cause for arrest); Utah R.
App. P. 46(b).

In sum, petitioner has not presented any

substantial issues that warrant review by this Court under rule
46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should deny
the petition for writ of certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

of September,

1990
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
/J
Assistant Attorney General

3
Indeed, the trial court was prompted to say:
I have never, in all my years on the bench,
spent as much time considering the trial, the
hearing and stayed awake at night wondering
what would be appropriate here, because I do
think that this matter got out of hand, it

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Opposition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Glenn
J. Ellis, Attorney for Petitioner,121 West State Street,
Hurricane, Utah 84737, this 38 ^"day of September, 1990.

/U^U^cJ(
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3
Cont. would re-examine [sic] their
procedures and determine why the matter went
that far.
(See Appendix ii attached to petitioner's petition.)
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Court of Appeals*
The Defendant was arrested on October ] 4, 1988, north of
I le c: <f

Laketown, Rich county

cl: lar gecl l:i ex: E .:i i

1 Jpoi i

his arrest written citations were issued * the Justices Court of
Wich Counl:','finrlc opi «s del ivered tc • 1:11

-efendant.

Informations

were thereafter filed by the County Attorney of Rich County i n the
Circuit Court

Defendant filed a Motion

Suppress which was

denied

, '.

Defendant was found guilty on all counts b. . *day

' Ar:ri'l, 2 989.

denial

tne , :::;

The Defendant appeals from jury verdict,

• his Motion to Suppress and denial of a Motion to Change

Venue.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court erred In refusing to grant Defendant'-

Motion to Change Venue.
2.

Whether

oi JII J!

I. he

fjJline) nl; iiinn 1 utonitaL ,i on alitei

citations had been filed constituted changing or amending of
cha^

defendant.
3.

Whether the officer arrested the Defendant illegally,

i.e., without ^ warrant for misdemeanor occurring outside of his
1

presence or as stated by the State whether the officer had probable
cause to make an arrest of the Defendant.
4.

Whether the Court erred in failing to suppress evidence.

5.

Whether or not the Court erred denying a motion to arrest

the jury verdict for doubt.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES & CASES
1.

Change of Venue Issue.

Section 77-35-29(e)(f) attached

hereto as Appendix 1.
2.

With reference to the Amendment of charges, see Section

77-7-18, Appendix 2;
3.

Relating

Section 77-7-21, Appendix 3.

to

failure

of

the

Defendant's motion to arrest judgment.
23 Arrest of Judgment.

Trial

Court

to

grant

See Section 77-35-23, Rule

See Appendix 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

A.

Nature of the Proceedings Belov.

The Defendant was arrested on October 14, 1988.
arrest he was taken to the Rich County Sheriff's Office.
time written citations were issued.
Defendant.

Upon his
At that

Copies were delivered to the

Rich County Attorney made a Motion to Transfer to the

Circuit Court which was granted by the Justice of the Peace.
Informations were filed in the Circuit Court of Rich County.
Defendant filed an

ff

Appearance, Plea, and Waiver of Service",

Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and a Motion to Change Venue.
Each was denied by the Court. The matter was tried before a jury.

2

Defendant thereafter made a motion to arrest judgment which was
denied by the court.
B.

Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Statement of Facts.

The Defendant Reid H. Ellis, a companion Mark T. LeFevre and
two minors, Lee Ellis, brother of the Defendant and Shane Miller
were first observed by Dee Hodges, who observed their vehicle pull
in front of his service station in Laketown, Utah.

(Tr. 37)

He

reported that one of the four went inside, then came back to the
front door and reported to the others in the car that they did not
have any Miller's brand of beer.

(Tr. 37)

His son Dennis Hodges

reported that one of the boys attempted to buy a 4-pack of coolers
(an alcoholic beverage), he had no identification and by reason
thereof Hodges refused to sell him the alcoholic beverage.
40)

(Tr.

Dennis Hodges identified the individual as Mark LeFevre. The

four boys, in the same vehicle, then proceeded one block south to
the Old Rock Store situated in Laketown, Utah, where Renee Earley
observed the four of them come into the store.

They were milling

around the store including the back of the store where she kept
cold beer.

(Tr. 49)

She identified the Defendant as one of the

boys in the store on the first occasion.

(Tr. 49)

They bought a

few things in the store and stayed approximately 5 minutes.
50)

(Tr.

The vehicle with the four boys came back a second time, three

of the four came in the store.
store became suspicious.

(Tr 51)

The proprietor of the

(Tr. 51) Mark LeFevre had a coat in his

hand on the second visit to the store.

(Tr. 53) Because the store

owner was nervous she asked her son to stand in the aisle and watch

3

the three boys.

The boys then departed the store.

left the store, the boys came back a third time.
juveniles entered the store with Mark LeFevre.

After her son

(Tr. 61) The two
(Tr. 62)

LeFevre

had a coat in his hand and went to the back of the store where the
beer cooler was located.

(Tr. 6 2 - 6 3 )

The two juveniles went to

the penny candy counter and requested that the proprietor count out
110 watermelon slices.

(Tr. 64) During the course of counting out

the candy, the store owner observed Mark LeFevre departing the
store with what she described as a "square coat" in his hand.

She

described the size of the square package beneath the coat as the
size of a 12~pack of diapers.

(Tr. 64)

Because of the unusual

appearance of the "square coat" she identified the car, the number
on the license plate and bumper stickers of rock bands on the back
of the car.

(Tr. 67)

The store proprietor went to the cooler and

found a 12-pack of beer missing from the store.
She

called

the

Sheriff

of Rich

County

(Tr. 68)
on two

separate

occasions and reported what she had observed to the Sheriff.

The

Sheriff received the call from Renee Earley at approximately 11
o'clock in the morning.

He was given a description of the events

which Renee Earley had observed.

(Tr. 108 -110) . Acting upon the

information that he had received from Renee Earley, the Sheriff
went to the Southeast shore of Bear Lake where he identified a blue
car in front of one of the summer residences that had bumper
stickers across the back.

The license number was the same as the

one reported to him by Renee Earley.

(Tr. Ill)

The Sheriff got

out of his car and went to the door of the summer residence where

4

he knocked on the door.

A voice within the cabin indicated that

the door did not work and to go around to the other side of cabin.
(Tr. 113)

The Sheriff went around to another door where he had a

conversation with Reid Ellis outside of the summer residence. (Tr.
113)

The Sheriff identified himself as a police officer, showed

Ellis his identification and indicated to Reid Ellis that there had
been a commotion in a couple of the stores in town and that some
beer had been taken from one of the stores.
Ellis if he could look around.

(Tr. 114)

He then asked Reid

The Sheriff testified

that the Defendant said he didn't have any beer and the Sheriff was
welcome to look around.
officer he could

Defendant admitted that he told the

look around.

(Tr. 311)

The Sheriff then

testified that the pair walked into the kitchen area of the summer
residence

where

refrigerator.

the

Defendant

opened

cupboards

and

the

(Tr. 115) The Defendant admitted that he opened the

cupboards and refrigerator for the officer.

(Tr. 312) The officer

then testified that as he and the Defendant were in the kitchen,
Mark LeFevre walked into the kitchen.

(Tr. 115)

The officer

smelled alcohol on LeFevrefs breath and asked him to blow in his
face (Tr. 116) and the officer smelled alcoholic beverage on his
breath.

(Tr. 116)

Turning to Reid Ellis the officer asked him if

he had been drinking whereupon Ellis said no and the officer
repeated the request to blow in his face.
alcohol on his breath.

(Tr. 117)

5

The officer smelled

Upon hearing noises in another part of the cabin, the officer
asked if he could talk to the other boys.
(Tr. 118)

Defendant replied yes,

Reid Ellis led the officer around to another section of

the cabin which required an exit from the kitchen area, a walk
around a path and an entrance into a bedroom area.

As the officer

stepped into the bedroom area he observed a can of beer on the
floor.

(Tr 119)

The officer had asked prior to that time who was

in charge of the cabin and the Defendant indicated that he was.
(Tr. 118)

The Defendant and the other three then indicated they

were all under the age of 21.

(Tr. 120)

At the time of trial the officer articulated that, at that
point, he had the following facts: he observed the same car as
Renee Earley had described parked at the summer residence; two of
the boys, both under age 21, Mark LeFevre and the Defendant Reid
Ellis had alcohol on their breaths; the can of beer in the cabin
was of the same type as reported stolen by the owner of the Old
Rock Store; no one in the room was old enough to drink or possess
beer and that there was being committed in the officer's presence,
possession of alcohol and consumption of alcohol by minors.
12-13 UCA)

(32A-

(Tr. 120)

The officer thereafter placed Reid Ellis under arrest and
cuffed one hand.
LeFevre

and

(Tr. 121)

Lee Ellis

A struggle ensued.

stood

up

from

a

positioned themselves behind the Sheriff.

(Tr. 123)

seated
(Tr 123)

Mark

position

and

The Sheriff

then drew his hand gun to protect himself because he "didn't want
to end up wrestling over the gun".
6

(Tr. 123)

The Sheriff,

realizing the situation, grabbed the loose hand cuff and attempted
to drag Defendant towards the door, put the gun back under his
belt, picked up the can of beer and got out of the doorway holding
onto the hand cuff.

(Tr. 124)

The Defendant at that time was

kicking at the officer, struggling and attempting to pull away.
The other three boys grabbed the Officerfs shirt, attempted to pull
him back into the cabin and attempted to pry his fingers off of the
can of beer the officer was preserving as evidence.

(Tr. 125) The

officer then released Reid Ellis, returned to his car where he
radioed for help.

Upon the arrival of other officers, the two

juveniles surrendered to the officers where it was noted that Levi
Miller, a juvenile had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath.
(Tr. 130)

During the next several minutes the officers made many

attempts to get the voluntary cooperation of the Defendant and Mark
LeFevre without success. The officers ultimately entered the cabin
and arrested the Defendant.

The Sheriff describes the Defendant

as very combative, irrational and was not using good judgment.
(Tr. 136)

At the time of the arrest the officer again smelled

alcohol on the breath of the Defendant.

(Tr. 134)

The Sheriff's

recognition of alcohol on the breath of Defendant Ellis and his
companion Mark LeFevre was verified by a State Park Officer Brian
House.

(Tr. 213) Officer Charlie Young of the Utah Highway Patrol

testified that he observed the Defendant Ellis at the time of the
arrest swing at the Sheriff or Officer Gregory with the hand that
had a hand cuff attached to it.

His statement at Tr. 218 is as

follows:

7

11

1 don't remember if it was Dan or Gregory
that grabbed his hand but one of them was
loose and Reid Ellis took a swing at Officer
Gregory the one with the hand cuff on it. It
was loose and swinging and they were able to
restrain him and get him out of the door and
they cuffed him outside on the patio ff.
Relative to the issue of the consensual search, Lee Ellis the
Defendant's brother, stated that he did not know if anyone said
that the Sheriff could come inside the building and look around,
but while the Sheriff was outside he heard Defendant say to the
Sheriff go ahead and look around at which the Sheriff replied,
"Let's go inside".

(Tr. 269)

The Defendant on the stand admitted telling the officer that
he could look around.
cupboards
building.

and

(Tr. 311)

refrigerator

Admitted voluntarily opening

for the

officer while

inside the

(Tr. 312)

When asked if the Sheriff of Rich County had showed him his
badge, the Defendant replied, "Well, the Lone Ranger has one of
those".

(Tr. 318)

Defendant also at trial (Tr. 319) testified as

follows:
Like I thought, he was one of those people who
dresses up like a cop and then rapes people.
I saw it on TV and I don't want to be a
victim. (Tr. 319)
The jury convicted the Defendant of all charges.

Prior to

sentencing Defendant made a motion to arrest the judgment which was
denied by the Court and the Defendant was thereafter sentenced.
Defendant appeals from the Judgment of Conviction.

8

II.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE
AS THE SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO MEET THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED
IN STATE V. JAMES.

See the affidavits at Appendix 5.

POINT II:
ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT CLAIMS THE COURT ALLOWED AN AMENDMENT
OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THE DEFENDANT THERE WAS IN FACT NO SUCH
AMENDMENT.

FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF A CITATION AND AN ENTRY OF

A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY AN INFORMATION MUST BE FILED.

THE DEFENDANT

WAS, IN FACT, TRIED UPON THE INFORMATION WITHOUT AMENDMENT THAT WAS
REQUIRED TO BE FILED UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH. See
77-7-21.

POINT III:
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CLAIMS HE WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED WITHOUT
A

WARRANT

FOR A

MISDEMEANOR

COMMITTED

OUT

OF

THE

OFFICER'S

PRESENCE, THE FACTS AS ARTICULATED BY THE OFFICER SHOW THAT CONSENT
TO

ENTER

THE

DEFENDANT'S

RESIDENCE

WAS

VOLUNTARILY

GIVEN.

DEFENDANT HAD THE SMELL OF ALCOHOL ON HIS BREATH AND WAS IN
POSSESSION OF ALCOHOL WHICH WERE MISDEMEANORS COMMITTED IN THE
OFFICER'S

PRESENCE

FOR WHICH

HE WAS

DEFENDANT WITHOUT A WARRANT.

9

ENTITLED

TO ARREST THE

POINT IV:
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND AND THE EVIDENCE REFLECTS THAT THERE WAS
CONSENT GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO ENTER THE RESIDENCE. UPON ENTRY
OF THE RESIDENCE THE OFFICER SAW IN PLAIN VIEW A CAN OF BEER WHICH
WAS SEIZED BY THE SHERIFF. NONE OF THE OCCUPANTS WERE OVER THE AGE
OF 21 AND THE BEER MATCHED THE DESCRIPTION OF THAT STOLEN FROM THE
OLD ROCK STORE IN LAKETOWN APPROXIMATELY 2 HOURS PRIOR TO ITS
SEIZURE.

POINT V:
THE JURY FOUND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD FOR THE
CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT ON ALL COUNTS, PARTICULARLY THAT OF
THEFT WHERE DEFENDANT AS THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE FIRST WENT TO
A SERVICE STATION WHERE AN OCCUPANT ATTEMPTED TO PURCHASE ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGES AND THEN DROVE TO THE OLD ROCK STORE WHERE ACHOLIC
BEVERAGES WERE ULTIMATELY TAKEN BY ANOTHER.
SMELL OF ALCOHOL ON HIS BREATH.

DEFENDANT HAD THE

HE EXHIBITED COMBATIVE AND

IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR EVIDENCING CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL.
ARGUMENT:
POINT I:
REID ELLIS CLAIMED THE COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING TO GRANT A CHANGE OF VENUE
Appendix 5 which is attached to this brief contains the
affidavits submitted by the Defendant in support of his motion for
change of venue.

By far the leading case in the area is the
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Supreme Court case of the State of Utah v. James, 767 P.2d 549
(Utah 1989).
Using the James case as a yardstick it becomes immediately
apparent that the Trial Court was "satisfied" in exercising its
discretion not to grant the motion to change venue.

The standard

of review as set forth in the James case at page 15 is that the
Appellate Court will not disturb the decision of the Trial Court
unless there is an abuse of discretion shown.
The affidavit of Reid H. Ellis, the Defendant, states his
opinion that during the hearing witnesses in the courtroom were
observed by him and he drew the conclusion that those witnesses
considered him guilty without a hearing.

He secondly concludes

that the residents of the community are biased against "summer
people11 without further substantiation.
The affidavit of Wayne Parry states that he is acquainted with
Sheriff Cockayne and that he was subjected to harassment by the
Sheriff

and his deputies because he was a new comer in the

community and he further alleges that the Sheriff and his deputies
stopped

his automobile, without probable cause, on 11 or 12

separate instances and accused the affiant of various criminal
offenses.
Assuming every fact of the affidavit is true the affidavit
concerns itself not with the prejudice of the community against
outsiders but with the perceived prejudice of a sheriff against one
outsider.

11

State v. James enumerates the elements necessary for a change
of venue as follows:
(a)

STANDING OF THE ACCUSED IN THE COMMUNITY.

There is no

evidence shown by the affidavits that this Defendant would receive
an unfair trial by the members of the community because he was a
member of a group known as H summer people".

Absent a showing by

affidavit that the members of the community are prejudiced against
summer

people, the Defendants

assertion must

fail.

State v.

Gellatli, infra.
(b)

THE SIZE OF THE COMMUNITY.

Rich County

community with approximately 2200 residents.

is a small

It has been stated

that the smaller the community the more likely there will be a need
for a change of venue.
heinous nature.

This rule has been applied to crimes of a

This crime hardly fits that category.

In the James case, concern was given because a substantial
number of the members of this community made an organized effort
to help locate a missing child.

In this case there is an isolated

incident of a theft from a store which was essentially un-noticed
in Rich County.

There is no showing from the affidavits of any

news publicity whatsoever.

Upon voir dire of the jury some of the

jury members had indicated that they heard of the case but it was
in regards to the Sheriff and not in regards to the Defendant.
(Tr. 21)

Therefore, the size of the community as it relates to the

Defendant is of little or no significance and the issue is not
addressed in the affidavits of the Defendant.
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(c)

THE NATURE AND GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE.

This offense

started out as a misdemeanor offense of theft of a 12-pack of beer.
It gravitated into assault on a police officer by the Defendant's
refusal to submit to arrest and to have the matter resolved in an
orderly fashion at the Rich County Sheriff's Office.

Nonetheless

the nature and gravity of the offense is not such that it should
be grounds for a change of venue.
(d)

NATURE AND EXTENT OF PUBLICITY.

Rich County.

There is no paper in

There was no publicity of this matter.

Some members

of the jury panel heard of this case but only through word of
mouth.

There was no evidence of a community feeling adverse to

defendant.

See State v. Gellatli, 449 P.2d 993 (Utah 1969) where

the Court said that mere allegations that the whole community has
knowledge of a crime by rumor particularly of a crime of the type
herein involved is insufficient to indicate that prejudice or bias
existed in the jurors who rendered the verdict.
(e)

Voir Dire of the jury as evidenced by the transcript

indicates that the jurors who had any preconceived opinions or had
formed an opinion about the case were dismissed.

A question to the

jury panel was asked as follows:
••Have any of you at this time formed an
opinion as to the officer's conduct in this
case, whether it be bad, good, improper or
proper?
In other words have you formed an
opinion?11
Answer by an unidentified juror
indicated, " I haven't formed an opinion but
I am struggling with the question".
The voir dire continued at page 21 of the transcript where the
question

was

asked

to

the

juror who
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was

struggling

with

the

question.

"Have you formed an opinion as to how this case should

be decided from the information you have?"
influenced".

Answer:

The juror was excused for cause.

ff

Ya, I feel

The pretrial bias

shown by the jury was not adverse to the Defendant but appeared to
be adverse to the Sheriff or his conduct in this case.
The voir dire of the jury indicates undeniably that there was
no adverse reaction to the Defendant by the jury but that some
members of the jury panel had reservations concerning the conduct
of the Sheriff.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Courtis
decision denying the motion to change venue reflects an abuse of
discretion by the Trial Court.
POINT II:
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT
OF THE CHARGES TO DIFFERENT AND MORE SERIOUS CHARGES.
Upon the arrest of the Defendant he was taken to the Rich
County jail where citations were issued charging him with Class B
Misdemeanor offenses.

Upon review by the Rich County Attorney's

Office, an information was filed in the Circuit Court alleging one
Class A offense of assault on an officer and misdemeanor offenses.
The Justice of the Peace transferred the matter to the Circuit
Court.
The officer is entitled to issue citations for misdemeanor
offenses.

Section 77-7-18 states (See Appendix 2) that an officer

in lieu of taking a person into custody

may issue and deliver

a citation requiring a person subject to arrest or prosecution on
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a misdemeanor or an infraction charge to appear at the Court of a
magistrate before whom the person should be taken pursuant to law
if the person had been arrested.

,f

A plea of

not guilty" was made

by the Defendant requiring the filing of an Information.

Section

77-7-21 provides that if a person pleads not guilty to an offense
charged, an information shall be filed and the proceedings held in
accordance with the rules of criminal procedure.

See Appendix 3.

The Defendant on the 22nd day of November, 1988, entered a
voluntary appearance in the Circuit Court, waived the service of
summons and entered a plea of not guilty.

(See Appendix 6)

The Information was not an amendment but an original document
filed as required by statute to which this Defendant filed a
voluntary appearance.

See Appendix 6. The Defendant's contention

that the State amended the charges is simply not substantiated by
the record.
POINT III
DEFENDANT CLAIMS HE WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED, WITHOUT A WARRANT,
FOR A MISDEMEANOR COMMITTED OUT OF THE OFFICER'S PRESENCE.
The Defendant was arrested by the Sheriff of Rich County at
the Harding Haven cabin about two hours after a shoplifting
incident at the Old Rock Store in Laketown.

The Sheriff, in his

testimony at the time of trial, states that at the time he drove
to the south end of the lake he had a reasonable suspicion that a
crime had been committed.

(Tr. 141)

The officer testified he had

prior experience with alcohol related situations.
Bar Journal, October,

1989, Col. 1 p. 12.
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(Tr. 107) Utah
That

reasonable

suspicion developed into probable cause when he smelled alcohol on
the breath of Reid Ellis who was not then 21.

(Tr. 141)

The

Sheriff thought it unusual that the Defendant was so quick to deny
evidence of beer in the house and his conduct in opening cupboards
and fridge for the inspection by the Sheriff. As the Defendant and
the Sheriff entered the second portion of the cabin a beer can was
observed of the same type as stolen from the Old Rock Store and by
reason of the fact that all of the occupants of the cabin were
under the age of 21 the Sheriff arrested that person in charge for
the offenses committed in the Sheriff's presence.
The Defendant seems unwilling to concede the fact that there
is credible evidence, believed by the Court and the jury, to the
effect that the Sheriff of Rich County observed the commission of
criminal offenses in his presence consisting of violations of
Section 32A-12-13 UCA relating to minors in possession of alcohol
and consumption of alcohol by persons under the age of 21.
State v. Johnson, 104 Adv. Rep. 34 decided by this Court on
March 21, 1989 describes the three constitutionally permissible
levels of police stops.
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any
time and pose questions so long as the citizen
is not detained against his will
(2)
An officer may seize a person if the
officer has articulative suspicion that the
person has committed or is about to commit a
crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop'1;
(3) An officer may arrest a person if the
officer has probable cause to believe that the
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
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The Johnson case concluded that the case involved the level 2 stop.
The

Officer,

at the

time he

approached

the

cabin, had

articulative suspicion having confirmed the description of the car
and

license

number

at

the

summer

home.

The

officer

then

interviewed the Defendant, perceived the smell of alcohol on his
breath, and found beer in the possession of the Defendant and
others which was the same type as that recently stolen from the Old
Rock Store.
The totality of the officer's testimony indicates that the
officer articulated to the Court and jury the transition from
articulative suspicion to probable cause to believe an offense was
being committed in the presence of the officer.
77-7-2 UCA allows a police officer to make an arrest without
a warrant if the offense is committed in his presence.
The Defendant asks this court to believe that the only offense
committed was that of theft and the Defendant was arrested for a
theft not committed in the presence of the officer.

The facts of

the case do not support Defendant's contention.
POINT IV
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE?
Upon filing of the Information by the Rich County Attorney's
Office, Defendant moved to suppress evidence.
S.

Perry,

Judge

of

Defendant's Motion.
evidence

the

circuit

Court

The Honorable Ted

refused

to grant

the

At the suppression hearing the Court heard

from the Sheriff of Rich County to the effect that

Defendant had consented to the search and had invited a search of
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the area by opening cupboards and refrigerator doors for the
Sheriff's inspection.

(Hearing pg. 53) The Sheriff then detected

the odor of alcohol on his breath and having determined that the
Defendant had consumed alcohol recently, was under the age of 21,
asked if he could talk to the other boys in the cabin.

(Tr. 54)

The Sheriff, upon entry into the second part of the cabin, observed
the can of beer similar to that which was stolen.
In State v. Joseph P. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah S.Ct. 1986)
the court stated:
Probable cause exists where "the facts and
circumstances within their (the officers')
knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information (are) sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that" an offense has
been or is being committed.
The Court further indicated:
The
validity
of
the
probable
cause
determination is made from the objective
standpoint of a "prudent, reasonable, cautious
police officer ... guided bv his experience
and training." (Emphasis added)
Reviewing the facts of this case using the standard set forth
in the Dorsey case, supra, the Officer's entitlement to search was
as a result of consent. The record reflects unequivocally that the
officer

did

determined

not

place

the

Defendant

under

that the Defendant had consumed

arrest

until

he

alcohol and found

alcohol in the building where he resided.
The record reflects that there was consent given by the
Defendant for the search of the property.

Such consent purged the

taint of any alleged unlawful search or seizure.
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In the case of

State of Utah v. Arrovo, 102 Ut. Adv. Rep. 34 decided February 15,
1989, this Court held as follows:
To determine whether or not consent is
voluntary we look at the totality of the
circumstances to see if consent was in fact
voluntarily given and not the result of duress
or coercion expressed or implied.
This Court then concluded that although the original illegal
stop was unconstitutional

Arroyo subsequent voluntary

consent

purged the taint from the initial illegality and the motion to
suppress should not have been granted.
Additional

theories might

also be

argued

to

assure the

constitutionality of the seizure such as exigent circumstances to
seize property which might otherwise be destroyed, search incident
to arrest and plain view.

However the fact remains that the Trial

Court at the suppression hearing and at the trial, had before them
evidence of consent to search given by the Defendant and further
evidence that there was in plain view an alcoholic beverage of the
same type as stolen from the Old Rock Store, in the possession of
the Defendant and others, gave the officer ability to seize the
beer without a search warrant.
It's as interesting to note that at page 42 of a suppression
transcript Mark LeFevre states that there was a can of beer that
"Reid found in the wood box by the A frame" that someone had left
there.

However, at the time of the trial the Defendant testified

as follows:
Well, when I first - - when I - - when he
showed - when he goes whatfs this, you
know, he said that, and I acted shocked. I
didn't - - I hadn't seen it before, I didn't
19

know where it was, or where it had come from,
and I thought maybe some other relatives had
left it there. I don't know.
The Sheriff is entitled to seize that which is in plain view.
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983).
POINT V
DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ARREST THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION?
See the case of State of Utah v. Larry W. Richards, decided
by this Court on August 30, 1989 and found in 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at
page 31.

The facts of that case and the facts of this case are

strikingly similar.
A.

In the Richards case evidence of the assault upon the

officer was controverted by the defendant.

Notwithstanding, the

Court concluded that the officer has probable cause to arrest
Richards for assault, regardless of the fact that the jury did not
believe that there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty.
The Court held that there was significant difference between
the quantum of evidence required for conviction and that required
to constitute probable cause for an arrest.
The standard of review in this case is that the Court review
the evidence of a jury verdict and all inferences that can be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict.

State v.

Tolman, 776 P.2d 422 (Utah Ct. of Appeals 1989); State v. Richards,
supra•
B.

The Defendant was charged with the offense of assault on

a police officer on duty. Looking at the evidence most favorable
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to the jury verdict, there is substantial evidence that Sheriff
Cockayne

identified himself to the Defendant verbally and by

exhibiting a badge.
(Tr. 125)

Sheriff Cockayne described the assault.

Officer Brian House describes an assault at page 218;

Officer Gregory describes an assault at page 236.
C.

Retail

Theft.

The

Defendant

was

a

driver

of an

automobile that went first to a service station where an attempt
to purchase beer was made.

The Defendant then drove the three

occupants to the Old Rock Store where the Defendant entered the
store on the first occasion.

On the second and third occasions

Defendant remained with the automobile.

LeFevre committed an act

of theft and the proceeds from that theft where taken to the
automobile which the Defendant was driving. When the Sheriff went
to Defendant's summer home, the Defendant had the odor of alcohol
on his breath.
76-2-101 requires that the Defendant act intentionally with
respect to each element of the offense.

Section 76-2-103 defines

intentionally as the conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result of the fact.

Although the Defendant

did not enter the store on the third occasion that fact does not
negate criminal responsibility by reason of the fact that he
apparently had knowledge and was aware of the conduct of others and
the existing circumstances. His participation is shown by the fact
that he had alcohol on his breath following the theft. Sub-section
2 of 76-2-103.
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D. The jury found the Defendant guilty of unlawful possession
of alcohol or possession by consumption.
In the record there appears evidence of the availability of
alcohol to the Defendant, that he was under the age of 21 years and
that he had alcohol on his breath as testified to by at least three
officers following his arrest. The officer described the Defendant
as combative, not very rational and not using good judgment which
certainly is indication of the consumption of alcohol.
The jury being the finder of fact had before it sufficient
facts upon which they could make a decision as to the guilt of the
Defendant

and it is incumbent upon this Court to review the

evidence of a jury verdict and all inferences that can be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict.
The Defendant would have this Court consider the actions taken
against the other three individuals as a fact to determine whether
or not the judgment should be set aside.
Section 76-2-203 provides as follows:
In any prosecution in which the actor's
criminal responsibility is based on the
conduct of another, it is no defense; (2);
(2)
That the person for whose conduct the
actor is criminally responsible has been
acquitted,
has not been prosecuted
or
convicted, has been convicted of a different
offense or a different type of class of
offense or is immune from prosecution.
There is credible evidence upon which the jury could base
a finding of guilty to each of the three offenses charged.
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SUMMARY
Reviewing the Defendant's brief the Defendant would like the
reader to believe that an innocent young man's rights have been
violated (Brief 12) by a overbearing sheriff (Brief 14) who induced
the County Attorney to throw the book at the Defendant.

(Brief 15)

The Defendant during the course of the trial sought not to deal
with the issue of the guilt or innocence
sought to try the officer.

(Tr. 157)

of the Defendant but

The Defendant's own conduct

in front of the jury as evidenced at page 306, 318 and 319 of the
transcript

evidences

a

lack

of credibility

the

jury

in all

likelihood considered in reaching their verdict.
The testimony of the officers shows there is ample evidence
in the

record

Defendant.

upon

which

to

sustain

the

conviction

of the

For the foregoing reasons the State asks this Court to

affirm the Trial Court's denial of the Motion to Suppress, affirm
the Trial Court's denial of a Motion to Change Venue and affirm the
jury's verdict and the Trial Court's judgment of conviction on
three counts.
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APPENDIX 1

77-35-29. Rule 29 — Disability and disqualification of a judge or
change of venue, (a) If, by reason of death, sickness or other disability,
the judge before whom a trial has begun is unable to continue with the
trial, any other judge of that court or any judge being so assigned by the
chief judge of the judicial council, upon certifying that he has familiarized
himself with the record of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified,
proceed with and finish the trial; but if the judge so assigned is satisfied
that neither he nor another substitute judge can proceed with such trial,
he may, in his discretion, grant a new trial.
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness or other disability, the judge before
whom a defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required
of the court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any
judge being so assigned by the chief judge may perform those duties.
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal action or proceeding shall file an affidavit that the judge before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing party to the suit, such
judge shall proceed no further therein until the challenge is disposed of.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
such bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon as practicable after
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. No such
affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith.
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of the allegation
of disqualification, he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof
be forthwith certified to another named judge of the same court or of a
court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged judge does net question the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is
certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge shall be called to
try the case or to conduct the proceeding If the judge to whom the affidavit
is certified does not find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall enter
a finding to that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed with the
case or proceeding.
(e) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that
a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the
action is pending, either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting
forth farts, ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit
are true and justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order
for the removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from
such objection and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred
forthwith to the court in such otl.er county. If, based thereon, the court
is not satisfied that the representations so made justify transfer of the
case, the court shall either enter an order denying said transfer or order
a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to such alleged prejudice.
(f) Whenever a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of record concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to
the judge vvho shall hear the case.

APPENDIX 2

77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction charge. A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into custody, or any public official of any
county or municipality charged with the enforcement of the law, may issue
and deliver a citation requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution
on a misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the magistrate before whom the person should be taken pursuant to law if the person had been arrested.

APPENDIX 3

77-7-21. Proceeding on citation — Voluntary forfeiture of bail —
Information, when required. (1) Whenever a citation is issued pursuant
to the provisions of section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation filed with the
magistrate may be used in lieu of an information to which the person cited
may plead guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail may be
forfeited. With the magistrate's approval a person may voluntarily forfeit
bail without appearance being required in any case of a class B misdemeanor or less. Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall be entered as a conviction and treated the same as if the accused pleaded guilty.
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear before a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued under section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the
offense charged, or does not deposit bail on or before the date set for his
appearance, an information shall be filed and proceedings held in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and all other applicable provisions of this code, which information shall be deemed an original pleading:
provided, however, that the person cited may by written agreement waive
the filing of the information and thereafter the prosecution may proceed
on the citation notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary.

APPENDIX 4
77-35-23. Rule 23 — Arrest of judgment. At any time prior to the
imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, or upon
motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged
is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be
just and proper under the circumstances.

APPENDIX 5

GLLN J. ELLIS, #1514
^EAN B. ELM*;, #4976
Attorneys for Plaintiff
"0 E^st'lCO South, Suite 102
P.O. Sox 1997
Provo, Utah 64603
Telephone: (cOl) 377 1097
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give

re

any

a ecu cod

to take

specifics.

ore
great

j^y

T

accuced

Lrcar.ii.-* and entering a hore.

;:d it to harr^sr

28

a new

that went

1S|

•'

lived

the sheriff

that he was going

6.

.- /

the

twelve

departmental

I lived

me nar.es, insult

15|

2GI!

r.y parents

attended

I

I was

of

121

2Ji

County

or

that

to harra^snent

everything

211

I

~2even

years

practically

17

Rich

School.

SI

9

in

;:0 n : ;

i r* ,-j.troi.

ii

1
21
31
4
51

9.

On one occasion myself and a friend were going to

61 a movie in another city, he kept us there in his car haranguing
and

7

harrassing

ccrrutted

of

us

to the

up our

12

accusing

us

falsely

of

having

On another occasion he stopped us while we were in
junior

prom

held us up for in excess

11

and

various offenses until we were too late to even go to

SI the show.
9
10.
10|| route

both

dates and

at our

high

school, he

intentionally

of two hours until we were late picking

the dance was

practically

over

with

when he

finally let us go.

13||

11.
hair.

U

I told him that my hair style was none of his bjsiness.
12.

15

Ke constantly harangued me about the length of ry
The

sad

truth

is,

that

of

all

the

tires

he

harrassed me and accused me, that Sheriff Cockayne never on any

1G|| of the eleven or twelve occasions that I can draw to mine, cv°r
did

17

have

any

evidence

of

any

wrene

doing

on

my

part

nor
c:.

a; : --I* c-nt ly did he have any evidence since I was never charjed

18

any

of

19 j three

20|

those

occasions

with

kind

of

an

offense.

(3) years that I lived in Pich County I was never

'ounc

jjilty or plead

the Sheriff's Department.

21

any

guilty

to any offense

In th~
L

uf a:

-

J

They se:r--d to just take great joy in

iG'-.^iir.j re because I was a new cor.er in the community ;.r;i was

22|| not oic enough to stand up for myself.
.,

13.

I

an

personally

aware

that

on

another

!

occasion a ^ood

24

also

friend of r ^, Tony Jackson, who is also a late

core: in the cor~unity was accused

by Sheriff Cockayne and his

25j| cvtuty of harboring a fugitive r.ared Bishop.
7r:e sole basis for their accusations against

2G

•.ere that he knew the Bishop toy.

The Sheriff broke into Tony1.-

t mm

J

'\

J
^'il
; » «. re

2,sil

v. :*.:.•• -t

a

warrant

and

:.r-

and

:
!' J *" V
tho >;-%::«-

.' r .C »'• 1 *'-d

'w

1

21
31

4

4

5|
severeljy
left
/

81

and

physically

him

in

they

i-.ether

jail

held

11

Tony.

three

(3)

incojnito

They

days

until

broke

without

Kr.

three

ribs

medical

Bishop

was

and

attention

picked

'jp in

r.ew comers

in the

state.

ccmunity,

1U| Cc.;:.ty

for

him

14.

9

attack

On

Mr.

for

con,.unity

the
Ellis

three

is not

a fair trial

question
is

(3)

of

absolutely
years

given

bias

fair

and

against

correct.
a

I

person

treatment

and

lived

from

cannot

if it is known that they are not

in

Rich

outside

expect

the

to

have

residents and long

121 time residents of Rich County, he just will not have a chance.
13!

DATED at Provo, Utah, this

frf

day of January, 19&9.
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that

he has

of January,

who
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by
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read
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me

1969,
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that

natters
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coated
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first
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duly

the

AFFIDAVIT

FOR CHANGE OF '. ENUE ana

thereof

except

day

PAPPY,

NOTION

co;.cents

251 kLOWledge

/ i

r ..orn

above e ri t :
r<-

IN £".

kr.c;:s ar.d u\:-:-r.-t
is

true

therein

of

ur^on

•

hi?

.for

O'.;:
-» L . « . ' » t

.6 belief and as to such ratters he believes then to be tr':<-v

2Go
:</
<>o

/? 5 77

P^

5

Subscribed

and

svorn

to

before

ir.e this jtyrh

day

January, 1989.

C^Ll)h±khn

::y Cor.".ission Expi

NOTARY^ i>^3LIC

s'l^olqj

Residing at: £)(• m

}7Q
/tk/)

HAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I r=iled a true and correct c
Of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT

IN SUri'CRT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION

CHANGE CF VENUE to
George Frceton
?.ich County Attorney
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 64321
L-y ct-:. o?; t ing

the

copies

.Vail, ; v.-tioe pror.iio, this

of
[~f

the

sr.r.e i.,to

the

United ST.*

c^y of Jut.uaiy, l!?i9.

GLEN J. ELLIS, #1514
DEAN B. ELLIS, #4976
Attorneys for Defendant
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
P.O. Box 1097
Provo, Dtah 84603
Telephone: (801) 377-1097

9386B

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR RICH COUNTY, RANDOLPH DEPARTMENT
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.
REID H. ELLIS,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

CRIMINAL NO. 88-SM-9

)
) SS
COUNTY OF UTAH
)
The defendant, being first duly sworn, on his oath,
deposes as follows:
1. I am the defendant named, and reside in Provo, Utah.
2. I do not believe that I could have a fair trial on
the charges against me in Rich County; during the suppression
hearing, I became aware of the presence in the back of the
courtroom of about ten persons, all residents of Rich County.
From their conversations it was immediately plain that they
considered me guilty, without a hearing, simply because my
family are owners of a lake cabin, and we do not reside in Rich
County.
3. They refer to us as •summer people' and are highly
biased against us, simply because we do not live in Rich County.
4. I intend to have a jury trial, and do not feel,
based on this experience, and many others of my family over the

2
Dated this 21st of December, 1988

ftuiau16
Reid Harding Ellis
VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH,

}

) ss
COUNTY OF UTAH.

)

On the 21st day of December, 1988, personally appeared
before me Reid Harding Ellis, , who by me being first duly sworn
did depose and say that he is the Defendant in the above
entitled action: that he has read the foregoing Affidavit in
Support of Motion for Change of Venue, and knows and understands
the contents thereof and that the same is true of his own
knowledge except as to matters stated therein upon information
and belief and as to such matters he believes them to be true.

Reid Harding Ellis
Subscribed
December, 1988.

and

sworn

to before me

this

21st

de&TTkiMfi-YiD
My Commission Expires:
V W f /

HOTA^tf #UBLIC
Residing at:/jUM}

ftffik,

day of

APPENDIX 6

GLEN J. ELLIS, #1514
DEAN B. ELLIS, 14976
Attorneys for Defendants
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
P.O. Box 1097
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 377-1097

9278B

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, RICH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, RANDOLPH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

DEPARTMENT

APPEARANCE, PLEA AND

Plaintiff,

KAIVER OF

SERVICE

VS.
Cr. N o .

REID H. ELLIS
De fendant,
and
VS.

Cr. No.

MARK T. LEFEVRE,

Judge

Defendants

Come
voluntary

now

the Defendants

appearance

in

the

by and

above

Informations,
October

filed

26,

1988,

numbered

2403

Court

Randolph,

1988

in

before

filing

of

have

and

by

received

the

also

County

thru Counsel, and

cases,

Summons, and enter a Plea of Not Guilty
Defendants

Perry

Waive

a

copy

Attorney
received

2404, which

were

issued

Judge

Ray

Cox.

formal

In

they were
the

Informations,

of

herein

have

on which

service

of

to all charges.

they

and

the

make a

un-numbered
on

copies

of

returnable
arraigned

JP

court

plead

"Not

they

or

about

Tickets

to

the

JP

October

14,

waived

the

Guilty*

to

all

charges, and were released on Bail*
Inasmuch
release
own

as the Sheriff of Rich County

Defendants,

Recoa ni 2 a nee -

(though
\

on

ordered

th#

released

Sheriff's

by

still refused
the

incfef^nr**

JP on
4-K**

to

their
h»

u*c

2
were

not

filed

until October

26th or

thereabout), Judge Perry

was contacted, he approved Bail, and defendants are at this time
free on $1,000 bail each.
The
13,

1988,

Clerk

at

has

1:30

given

PM.

will, unless otherwise

Counsel

Waiving

a Trial

the

instructed

Date of December

informalities,

defendants

by the Court, appear

at that

time for trial.
At
their

the

same

Motions , to

time

the

Suppress

Defendants

and

To

will

Dismiss,

also

and

appear on

will

request

sanctions for failure to cooperate in Discovery,
Dated this 22 nd of November, 1988.

s i

; /

Glen J. Ellis', Attorney for Defendants,
MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed
ENTRY

OF

Randolph,

PLEA
Utah

a copy

of

to George
84064,

the

foregoing APPEARANCE, WAIVER AND

Preston, Rich

and

to

31

Co. Attorney,

Federal

Avenue,

Eox 402,

Logan, Utah

84321, attorney for Plaintiff, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of
November, 1988 by depositing the same in the United States Mail.

, Attorney

